Insanity

A person is not criminally responsible for an act or omission if at the time of doing the act or making the omission he is in such a state of mental disease or natural mental infirmity as to deprive him of capacity to understand what he is doing, or of capacity to control his actions, or of capacity to know that he ought not to act or make the omission - Porter

1. Generally

* The Doctrine of insanity is concerned with those situations where the defendant is said to be suffering from a disorder of reason such that the defendant does not know right from wrong.
* The Doctrine of insanity is concerned with the cognitive capabilities of the defendants; their ability to reason, and distinguish right from wrong
* It is the existence of such defects, which legally reduce criminal responsibility of the particular defendant.

M’Naghten’s Case (1843)

Facts: M’Naghten was charged with murder when he shot and killed a man but wad acquitted on the grounds of insanity. Consequently, the HOL put certain questions to the judges concerning ht e law of insanity and obtained to following reply.
Held: Every man is presumed to be sane, and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be responsible of his crimes until the contrary be proved by reason of insanity. The following test is to be applied.

M’Naghten Rules:

The defence of insanity is defined as requiring the defendant to prove on the balance of probabilities that the defendant was:

1) Suffering from a disease of the mind at the time of the act;

2) as a result of the disease, the defendant was suffering from a defect of Reason;

3) As a result of the defect, the defendant either (a) did not know the nature and Quality of his/her act, or if he/she did know it (b) did not know that the act was wrong.

Porter (1933) - followed M’Naghten rules

Facts: D was charged with murder for the poisoning of his child. He also tried to kill himself in the same manner however was interrupted by the entry of the police.
Held: The jury found the accused NOT GUILTY on the ground of insanity at the time of the commission of the act.

2. Defect of reason (First Limb)

Sodeman (1936)

* Defect of understanding and not volition or emotion
* Must have no intellectual awareness that his or her act was wrong
* Accused must be ‘disabled from knowing that it was a wrong act to commit…he was disabled from reasoning with a moderate degree of composure and sense as to wrongness of what he is doing…’ - Spigelman CJ in R v Cheatham
* It must first be shown that the defendant was suffering from a defect or reason. That is, that at the time of the offence the defendant was not capable of reasoning. Willgross

Willgross (1960) - whether intellectual apprehension must be accompanied by moral feelings

Facts: Willgross was charged with murder when he shot the deceased during the course of a burglary at the deceased’s house. He pleaded insanity and there was evidence that he was a gross psychopath in that he suffered fro ma serious lack of self-control and emotional feeling although he was intellectually capable of knowing his acts were wrong. He was convicted and sought leave to appeal.
Held: In considering the defence of insanity, mere intellectual apprehension by the accused of the wrongness of his acts could amount to knowledge, and it was not necessary to show that the accused had a sufficient appreciation or feeling about the affects of his acts on other people.

3. Disease of the mind (Second Limb)

* A relevant defect of reason will only ground the defence of insanity if it derives from the disease of the mind.
* It must be a disease, disorder, or disturbance - M’Naghten
* A malfunctioning of the mind of transitory effect caused by the application to the body of some external factor such as violence, drugs, including anaesthetics, alcohol and hypnotic influences cannot fairly be said to be due to disease - Quick (1973)
* It must be shown that the defect of reason arose from the disease of the mind. The arguments in favour would be strong. The epilepsy is an internal cause that is likely to recur. This reflects an underlying pathological infirmity of the mind. R v Radford; R v Falconer.
* It would seem likely that epilepsy would be regarded as a disease of the mind and there is in fact authority to that effect. R v Sullivan
* The condition need not be permanent. R v Kemp.

4. Onus of Proof

The jury must consider “whether the things which constitute the crime were done to the question whether the man who did them was criminally responsible for his actions or was not, because of unsoundness of the mind at that moment, it is necessary for the accused person to make out positively, on the balance of probabilities that he was not criminally responsible and that he was not of such a mental condition a the time as to be criminally responsible”.

The jury must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt, to the exclusion of all
doubt, of the following:

1. That he did administer strychnine to the child
2. That he did so with the intention of killing it; and
3. That the child’s death did result from that administration

Then, you will proceed to consider whether at the particular time when he did those things:

4. His state of mind must have been one of disease, disorder or disturbance, as to prevent him from:
            (a) knowing the physical nature of the act he was doing; or
            (b) knowing that what he was doing was wrong
  
5. Knowledge of nature and quality of act or wrongness

* As a result of disease of the mind, D was unable to appreciate the nature and quality of the act committed by D, which has attracted the criminal charge. I.e. to the physical nature of the act in question. The D may think the destruction of life, that to him it is no more than breaking a twig. He would not know the implications and what it really amounted to - Porter (1933)

* Refers to the physical character of the conduct, but also to the significance of the conduct itself - did the defendant know the nature and quality of his act such that he knew what the outcome would be? - Willgross

* It must be shown that the defendant did not understand the nature and the quality of the act. In all jurisdictions this requirement refers to the physical nature of the act and would appear to be satisfied on these facts. If it is accepted that the defendant was in a dissociative state it would appear that the defendant did not understand what the defendant was doing or the physical consequences of the defendants actions

Stapleton (1952) - It must be proved that D knew it was morally wrong, not legally wrong.

Facts: Stapleton was charged with murder and pleaded insanity. Evidence showed that he belonged to a family with a history of mental deficiency and abnormality. The trial judge directed the jury on the issue of insanity by telling them that the defence depended, inter alia, upon   the accused not knowing what he was doing was wrong, in the sense of being contrary to the law. He was convicted and appealed.
Held: In applying the test of insanity as formulated in M’Naghten’s case, the question was whether the accused knew that his act was wrong according to the ordinary principles of reasonable men, not whether he knew it was wrong being contrary to the law.

Not knowing the act is wrong

1. Where D knows the physical nature of D’s act, where owing to disease of the mind, D knows not that the act is wrong may secure an acquittal

2. An evaluation of whether or not that the accused Stapleton v R can reason about wrongness.

3. Moral wrongness (aka - Contrary to law) not a legal wrongness

4. did not know it was wrong

* Even where D knew the nature and quality of his or her act, D may secure an acquittal if he or she proves, on the balance of the probabilities that he or she did not know that the act was wrong, due to a disease of the mind.
* The main question is whether or not D was able to reason with a moderate degree of sense and composure. If he or she was unable to reason, then it could be said that D could not know that he or she was doing wrong - Porter
* Finally, and alternatively, it must be shown that the defendant did not understand that what they were doing was wrong. In all jurisdictions except SA, the focus of this limb is upon the accused being incapable or reasoning as to whether the conduct was right or wrong. Wrong in this context means morally wrong. It does not refer to a failure to understand that the act was legally wrong. The question is whether at the time of the offence the accused was capable or reasoning as to right or wrong having regards to the everyday standards of reasoning people – apply objective test - Porter
* In determining whether the defendant was capable of reasoning in the same way as an ordinary person, the jury may consider whether the defect of reason was such that the defendant was unable to reason with a moderate degree of sense and composure - R v Porter; Stapleton v R,
* If the defence of insanity for murder cannot be proven, there would be the alternative of returning a verdict of manslaughter on the basis of diminished responsibility.
 
5. Fitness to be tried

* The mental state of the accused may also be relevant tat the time of the trial.
* The test for unfitness o be tried differs from that for criminal insanity - R v Presser [1958] approved in R v Mails (2001):

“He needs...to be able to understand what it is that he is charged with…be able to plead to the charge and to exercise his right of challenge…understand generally the nature of the proceeding… [and] the course of the proceedings...the substantial effect of any evidence that may be given against him…needs to be able to make his defence or answer to the charge.”

6. Diversion of Accused persons with disabilities from the Criminal Justice System

DPP v Mills - NSW Court of Appeal considered the scope of the Mental Health (Criminal Procedure) Act 1990 as a means of diverting persons, who because of mental, intellectual or other disability, need treatment not punishment from the criminal justice system.

7. Insanity: Criticism

R v Massei - Defence lawyers actively seek to avoid insanity as a defence, in favour of ‘substantial impairment’, as a result of the government policy of keeping the criminally insane criminally incarcerated long after they are well enough to be released.

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