2. Adducing Evidence – Witnesses
2. Adducing Evidence – Witnesses
2.1 Calling of witness
• Witness testimony most common form of giving evidence
• Witnesses testify to facts and opinions. Expert witnesses can testify their opinion
• Out of court statements by witnesses may be admissible
• Witness testimony is adduced by examination in chief or cross examination
• Witness comes to court in answer to subpoena.
• Witness must be competent, if competent they will be compellable
• Demeanour, reliability and substance of witness’s evidence can be tested in oral testimony.
• Witnesses testify on oath or affirmation this is sworn testimony
• Witnesses can also give unsworn testimony
• There is a difference between sworn and unsworn testimony: Implications of perjury are not there for unsworn and unsworn carries much less weight.
• There is inherent power in court for judge to call witnesses, although Calling of witnesses is ordinarily a function for the parties, rarely the judge.
General Powers of a Court s11
(1) The power of a court to control the conduct of a proceeding is not affected by this Act, except so far as this Act provides otherwise expressly or by necessary intendment.
(2) In particular the powers of a court with respect to abuse of process in a proceeding are not affected.
Court's control over questioning of witnesses s26
The court may make such orders as it considers just in relation to: (a) the way in which witnesses are to be questioned; and (b) the production and use of documents and things in connection with the questioning of witnesses; and (c) the order in which parties may question a witness; and (d) the presence and behaviour of any person in connection with the questioning of witnesses.
• It has been held that the 'wide powers' given by this provision and s11 to a court include a power to call witnesses Milano Investments Pty Ltd v Group Developers Pty Ltd unrep (1997).
Clark Equipment (1988) (Civil proceedings)
• Parties are usually responsible for calling witnesses and the order in which they are called
• However, Court has inherent power to call a witness but it is rare for a judge to do this
Criminal Cases: Prosecution Witness - Apostilides
1. Can question P on reasons, invite to reconsider, can’t direct P to call witness
2. Not adjudicate on those reasons
3. May make comment to jury as to effect of leaving out material witness
4. Can in the most exceptional of circumstances call a witness himself
5. Threat to P is that verdict may be unsafe and unsatisfactory
6. P must consider his/her duties: Kneebone v R (1999)
R v Apostilides (Responsibilities of the prosecution)
Facts: This was a sexual assault trial in which two witnesses were not called by the prosecution the witnesses were also not called to testify by the trial judge, which left the defence to call the witnesses; this left the prosecution to ask leading questions.
• The matter went to the high court which gave six propositions as to the responsibilities of the prosecution.
Held:
1. The Crown Prosecutor alone bears the responsibility of deciding who is to be called for as a witness for the Crown.
2. The trial judge may, but is not obliged to question the prosecution as to why he did not call a witness.
3. The trial judge may invite the prosecutor to reconsider the implications of not calling a witness, but can not direct a prosecutor to call a particular witness.
4. When charging the jury, the judge may make comments as he thinks appropriate with respect to the prosecution’s failure to call witnesses
5. In the most exceptional circumstances the trial judge can call a witness.
6. The decision not to call a particular witness will not set aside a conviction, unless viewed against the conduct of the whole trial, a miscarriage of justice has occurred.
• The effect of Apostilides is not so severe now because of s38 of the EA s38 is a procedure for cross-examining your own witness if they are unfavourable. It replaces the hostile witness doctrine.
R v Kneebone (1999) (Prosecutor’s first duty to present case fairly: Failure of Prosecution to call important witness)
Facts: Girl complains of sexual assault by her mother's new husband. The girl said her mother walked in during the sexual assault and said “that’s enough”. Father continued.
• The girl’s credibility was questioned. Neither side called the mother as a witness, whose evidence would have been very important.
• Notwithstanding, that on the evidence of the complainant, her mother was a material eyewitness, she was not called by the Crown as the crown believed her to be unreliable – a conclusion only available to the court post evidence.
Held: James J: First duty is that the prosecutor presents the case fairly.
• There was no basis put forward in evidence which would have entitled the Crown prosecutor, on the basis of unreliability, to have formed the view that the mother should not properly have been called in the Crown case. There was, for example, no evidence that the mother was unwilling to speak to the police; nor was there any attempt to interview her there must be identifiable facts which justify the such a conclusion. M m
• By reason of the failure to call the mother, occasioned by the failure to adopt an appropriate course to enable proper consideration of the question of unreliability, a miscarriage of justice occurred.
• Crown has a duty to call material witnesses and must have a conference with them before deciding whether they are to be called.
Velevski
Facts: Velevski was on trial for killing wife and children Crown said V killed them all, whilst defence said mother killed them and then committed suicide
• Trial became a ‘Battle of experts’
Issue: Did the prosecution have an obligation to call all of the pathologists (experts) who agreed with the main forensic pathologist’s report?
Held:
• Gleeson J: Fairness to the accused did not extend to calling witnesses having differing opinions
• Gaudron J: Would be going too far to have to call all the witnesses
• Gummow and Callinan JJ (minority): Crown should have called them however it didn’t amount to a miscarriage of justice because they didn’t call all the witnesses
2.2 Competence and Compellability
• Witness has been called and they come into witness box and they have to be competent
• Competence - a person is competent if that person may lawfully be called to give evidence
• Compellability - a person is compellable if that person can lawfully be obliged or required to give evidence.
• Sworn - on oath or affirmation
• Unsworn - not on oath or affirmation; definition in s13(2), given less weight
Competence and compellability s12
Except as otherwise provided by this Act:
(a) every person is competent to give evidence; and
(b) a person who is competent to give evidence about a fact is compellable to give that evidence
All witnesses are presumed competent, and all witnesses who are competent are compellable. The effect of this provision is that all witnesses are both competent to give evidence and compellable to give evidence. The succeeding provisions provide exceptions to that general proposition. Note 'competent to give evidence about a fact' allows a court to decide that a witness is competent to find evidence about some facts but not others. Includes children as in R v Brooks (1998)
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Continued
(c) The Rule in Brown v Dunne
Brown v Dunne (1894)
•
Held: The rule from this case stipulates that where the
cross-examining party intends to later contradict a witness by calling
further evidence, or by suggesting that a witness’ evidence can be
otherwise explained, the witness should be given opportunity in
cross-examination to comment upon the contradictory version.
• This is particularly important because the burden of proof is on the prosecution in Criminal cases.
• At common law, a breach of this rule will prevent a party from leading the evidence.
• This is a rule of practice, based on fairness, which gives:
1. the witness the chance to respond to the allegations, explain contradictions, and respond to attack, and;
2. gives other party the chance to call corroborative evidence, or otherwise contradict the inference.
Leave to recall witnesses s46
(1)
Court may give leave to a party to recall a witness to give evidence
about a matter raised by evidence adduced by another party, being a
matter on which the witness was not cross-examined, if the evidence
concerned has been admitted and:
(a) It contradicts evidence about
the matter given by the witness in examination in chief; or (b) the
witness could have given evidence about the matter in
examination-in-chief.
(2) A reference in this section to a matter
raised by evidence adduced by another party includes a reference to an
inference drawn from, or that the party intends to draw from, that
evidence.
• S46 is essentially a statutory incarnation of the rule in Brown v Dunne, designed to promote fairness in court proceedings.
R v Birks (1990) (Criminal Case failure of defence counsel to cross examine complainant, and put to her new evidence.)
Facts:
Birks was not cross-examined by his defence counsel on his denial of
sexual assault in relation to anal sex against the complainant, and on
how the complainant received facial injuries this led to a vigorous
attack by the prosecution who suggested he had made up his story
•
The Crown then asked the Trial Judge for a direction to jury for
adverse inferences there was no objection then the defence counsel
claimed he’s made a mistake, but by then it was too-late to re-open the
case (jury had retired).
• He was indicted for 18 counts of sexual assault, including vaginal, oral and anal sex.
•
Birks maintained that he had instructed his lawyers that no anal
intercourse took place what was required for fairness was to put to
the complainant that there was never any anal intercourse and that she
was hit in the head with a torch.
Held:
1. It is accepted
as a rule of professional practice in New South Wales that there is a
general requirement that a cross-examiner put to an opponent’s witness
the matters in respect of which it is intended to contradict the
witness' evidence. Defence Counsel should have done this to the
complainant.
2. The rule has different practical content in a
criminal trial. While it is a rule of fairness, fairness has different
emphasis in a criminal trial, especially when accused is unrepresented.
3. The consequences of the failure to observe the rule will vary
depending on the circumstances of the case but will be related to the
central object of the rule, which is to secure fairness incompetence
will not of itself attract appellate intervention.
• The appeal
court considered that the defence counsel's errors led to a miscarriage
of justice said the direction to the jury shouldn’t have been given,
as the complainant was not given the opportunity to answer these new
statements and should have been recalled.
• Sometimes the
interests of justice will be served by recalling a witness or stating
that counsel may not call evidence new trial on all charges ordered.
Payless Superbarn (1990) (Judge’s discretion to exclude evidence entirely, based on the Rule)
Facts:
Mrs O’Gara suing payless supermarket for personal injury she endured by
slipping on a grapes and injured her back the plaintiff’s evidence
was that she slipped on grapes.
• Husband also gave evidence
that his wife fell on grapes that kids threw on the ground, and there
was an incident form written by the store manager he put in report
that there was a foreign substance on the floor.
• The
plaintiff was not cross-examined on the presence of grapes, and neither
was husband there was no challenge to presence of grapes on floor
• However the Store Manager gave oral evidence that there was nothing on the floor (after P’s case closed)
Held:
Trial Judge said there was a breach of the rule in Brown because the
Defendant hadn’t cross-examined the Plaintiff about presence of grapes
on the floor.
• As a consequence of breach of the Brown v Dunne
rule, the Judge directed the jury to disregard evidence of the Store
Manager.
• Court of Appeal determined whether this was
appropriate consequence/remedy ruled by trial judge it regarded the
step of excluding evidence otherwise relevant and admissible as an
extreme consequence of the breach, but with no evidence that the judge
had taken irrelevant matters into consideration, it could not be shown
that discretion had been inappropriately exercised.
• There are
no set consequences for a breach of this rule, and thus a judge must
exercise discretion in the interests of justice.
2.6 Re-examination (Re-opening and rebuttal)
•
Civil and criminal trials apply the same principles in relation to
reopening however, where a party seeks to reopen in a civil case, the
`interests of justice' are understandably party-neutral.
Limits on re-examination s39
On
re-examination: (a) a witness may be questioned about matters arising
out of evidence given by the witness in cross-examination; and (b)
other questions may not be put to the witness unless the court gives
leave.
• s39(b) does allow for an application for leave of
the court matters which should have been entered in examination in
chief this however is a discretionary power.
Drabsch v Switzerland General Insurance [1999](Misleading statement in cross-examination.)
Facts:
In cross-examination a witness admitted that an answer he gave in
evidence-in-chief was false in re-examination questions going to the
witnesses state of mind when he made that admission were allowed.
Held: Re-examiner is not solely limited to eliciting clarifications or giving explanations where there is an ambiguity.
•
Re-examination is allowed whenever an answer in a cross-examination
would, unless explained, leave the court with an impression of the
facts which could be construed unfavourably towards the party calling
the witness, or which presents an incomplete or distorted account of
the facts.
- Test in Criminal Cases
• There must be:
1. Exceptional circumstances - such as serious breach of the rule in Brown v Dunn: R v Birks
2. The prosecution could not reasonably have foreseen the exceptional circumstances: R v Chin
R
v Chin (1985) (Fairness to the accused requires prosecution to present
all evidence – re-examination only in exceptional circumstances.)
Facts:
Choo and Chin had been charged with being knowingly concerned in the
importation of heroin part of their defence was that they did not
know each other prior to their arrest.
Issue: Whether the Crown
could reopen to tender evidence showing that Choo’s visa application
used the phone number of Chin’s father’s business, after the defence
had closed its case no attempt was made to prove this evidence in the
Crown's case in chief.
Held: Dawson J: The guiding principle is that the prosecution ought not to be permitted to split its case.
•
The prosecution must call all the evidence available to it in support
of its case during the presentation of that case if it fails to do
so, it ought not to be allowed to remedy the situation by calling
evidence in reply except in exceptional circumstances.
• A case
will not be exceptional where the situation ought to reasonably have
been forseen by the prosecution. The relevant principle is essentially
one of fairness the prosecution must offer all its proofs during the
progress of the prosecution case.
• Although the prosecution
could not have called Chin in the case against him, nor could they have
called Choo, they could have called a witness from the Department of
immigration to tender the application the phone number could quite
easily have been introduced during the prosecution’s case
• Therefore the situation was not an exceptional one meaning the trial was miscarried.
- Test in Civil Cases
Consider the interests of justice - are they better served by re-opening? Trial Judge has a discretion: Consider:
Urban Transport Authority v Nweiser (1992) (Inadvertance on Counsel’s part re-examination test.)
Facts:
Nweiser’s Counsel rested case, then realised they had stuffed up and
still had 2 more witnesses to call - had only just rested (very little
time gap.)
• Trial Judge had refused to allow them to re-open
on ground that failure was deliberate, although mistaken, and even
though there was certainly no tactical gain Nweiser made application
to reopen
Held: Clarke JA: motivation in re-opening was not "impure" if it was a tactical decision it would have been refused.
•
The exercise of the discretion to allow an application to re-open
depends essentially upon the judge’s view as to whether the interests
of justice are better served by granting than refusing the application'
here all that occurred was that some time had passed between the
closing of the defendant's case and the application by the defendant to
call a witness.
• Consider the following:
1. Timing
(how late is it? The longer after closing statements, the less likely
the application will succeed.) – here it was immediately after closing
statement
2. Detriment (is there surprise, detriment, other
prejudice) - was none in letting 2 additional witnesses testify - they
were expected throughout to testify and were not called simply by
inadvertence; there was no extra cost since there was sufficient time
to hear them
3. Motive (if you fail to prove an element of your
case, is it through ignorance (in which case you will probably get
leave to re-open), or is there a tactical reason (much more likely to
fail) - was not sandbagging (holding out the good stuff until after it
cannot be answered)