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Topic 5 - Nature and Constitution of Trusts
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By Student at Law
Published on 27/05/2007
 

Nature and Constitution of Trusts
(A)    The Nature and Classification of Trusts
The nature of trusts

History
•    One would convey land to a friend or family member for the use of the beneficiaries
•    Perpetually prevent property from falling into the hands of someone higher up in the feudal order
•    The Statute of Uses 1535  if any conveyance done for the “use” of someone else, legal property belongs to them and they pay taxes.
•    “Uses upon uses” A conveys to B for the use of C. C wouldn’t pay taxes
•    Trust has become valuable commercial tool, not only used by wealthy families etc, but also used today as investment vehicles  Trustees have entrepreneurial role for the beneficiaries, who still have beneficial ownership.
•    It is used in superannuation.
•    The Rule in Saunders v Vautier  A sole beneficiary of legal age can call for the property to be transferred to them absolutely.
•    No requirement of privity in trust, or meeting of minds etc as in contract.

Definitions

Pettit’s Definition
A trust is an equitable obligation, binding a person (who is called a trustee) to deal with property over which he has control (which is called the trust property) either for the benefit of persons (who are called beneficiaries or cestui que trust) of whom he may himself be one, and any one of whom may enforce the obligations, or for a charitable purpose, which may be enforced at the instance of the Attorney-General, or for some other purpose permitted by law though unenforceable.

Jacob’s definition:
The trustee must hold legal or equitable interest in property, he must be under a personal obligation to deal with that property for the benefit of the beneficiaries, and his obligation must be annexed to the trust property.

Essential Elements:
•    Trustee holds legal or equitable title to property
•    There must be identifiable property for there to be a trust
•    Trustee has a fiduciary obligation to hold that property for the benefit of others (beneficiaries).
•    Breach of this obligation attracts both personal and proprietary consequences
•    Can’t hold trust for yourself  that would make you the absolute owner

Classification of trusts

Express Trust
•    Created by express declaration, which can be found either in an agreement (will, contract) or common intention held by the parties to the trust
•    Require 3 certainties to be recognised
1.    Certainty of intention
2.    Certainty of subject matter  which property
3.    Certainty of objects  Who the beneficiaries are or how they are to be identified
•    Public or Private (i.e. charitable or not)
•    Fixed or discretionary
Fixed: Trustee must pay each beneficiary a proportion of the trust income fixed by the trust deed/common intention. The trustee thus simply manages the trust property and has no further discretion

Discretionary: Exists whenever the trustee has a discretion as to: (1) what proportion of the income should be paid to each beneficiary and/or (2) which of the beneficiaries is to receive income including giving all to one at the exclusion of others

Resulting Trust
•    Implied?
•    E.g. where a person buys property in the name of another where there was no intention to make a gift.

Constructive Trust
•    Comes from verb to construe ‘not to construct’
•    Trust imposed by the court irrespective of the parties’ intentions in circumstances where it would be unconscionable for the legal title holder to deny the beneficial interest claimed by another.
•    Oughtred Case

(B)    Distinction Between Trusts and other Legal Relationships
Distinction between trusts and other relationships

Fiduciaries
•    A trust is a fiduciary relation, but every fiduciary relation is not a trust. A fiduciary is not a trustee where there is no property vested in the fiduciary which can be described as trust property
•    E.g. Co director owes duty to the corporation but they don’t hold property on trust for shareholders. The corporation owns the property absolutely and equitably, not the directors.

Clay v Clay

Facts: Woman was guardian for children, she bought house from trustees of husband. She kept it as a home for children. Trustees fritted away trust and money from the house. They then attempted to bring action against mother, claiming she was a guardian therefore a trustee.

Held: She owed fiduciary duties but this did not make her a trustee for the house
•    See discussion about difference between legal relationship and trust

Executors
•    Executor’s ability to hold estate is not encumbered by any interests until administration of the estate is complete.
•    “The principal duties of an executor are to get the assets of the deceased, to pay his debts, to pay legacies given by the will, and to distribute the assets.”
•    Consider Livingstone’s case

Bailment
•    Bailee is not a trustee because a bailee acquires possession only of personal property and legal ownership of the property. Bailment is a common law doctrine.
•    It is a transfer of possession for limited use not legal ownership of property
•    Applies only to chattels in possession (choses in possession not choses in action)
•    E.g. Take jacket to dry cleaner  Cleaner is a bailee and you are bailor. Dry cleaner is not trustee, they don’t have legal ownership, you do
•    Doesn’t involve creation of separate legal interests

Agency
•    Common law doctrine
•    Fiduciary relationship whereby a principal appoints an agent (legal position) to act on his behalf (e.g. bring principal into binding contractual arrangements with a third party)
•    Not everyone who calls themselves an agent in common parlance is an agent. E.g. A real estate agent is not a legal agent, they don’t sign the contract for you.
•    An agent does not get legal title to any property, although he may get possession

When does an agent become a trustee?
•    An agent becomes a trustee only when they hold property legally for the principal
•    Not all agency arrangements – even those which involve the agent handling property or receiving money – will create a trust relationship.
•    We look at the terms of the agency agreement, the relationship the parties created and the obligations between them
•    Paul v Constance  trust arises when we see an intention that trust arises when there is property being held by one who is conscience bound to another.

Imagine two alternative contracts of agency

1.    P appoints A to find buyers for P’s produce. The terms of the agreement are:
•    A may contract with B on behalf of P
•    In order to fulfil the contract with B, A will take delivery of produce from P on the basis that A bear all the risks from the moment of delivery
•    B may discharge the obligation to pay for the produce by paying A.
•    A is to pay P for the produce within 30 days, whether or not A has received payment from B.
•    As long as the agent is solvent, principal will get what they bargained for.
These terms do not create a trust over any receipts A holds from the sale of produce

2.    P appoints A to find buyers for P’s produce. The terms of the agreement are:
•    A may contract with B on behalf of P.
•    A is to take delivery of produce as P’s bailee, and deliver to B.
•    B may discharge the obligation of payment for produce by paying A
•    A is to receive payments into a separate account for P
•    A is authorised to make withdrawals from that account to satisfy P’s obligation of paying A an agreed amount for A’s services
These terms would create a trust. Principal does not lose ownership when agent exchanges the property for proceeds. If agent is insolvent, these proceeds from sales are held on trust for the principal who is the beneficiary.
   
Cohen v Cohen

Facts: Jewish couple flee Germany. Wife leaves before husband and authorises him to enter into agreements on her behalf regarding property she left in Germany. Wife sues husband for money he owed. The Statute of Limitations had expired for a claim in debt, so she tried arguing that he held the property on trust (avoids perpetuity problem) and thus was obliged to replenish the trust fund.
There were three claims:
1)    She authorised husband to sell personal chattels and use the proceeds to buy business equipment for himself (which he was allowed to export). He would then repay her out of his own funds.
2)    There was money from sale of furniture and he failed to give her this money
3)    He made an insurance claim for jewellery – received 120 pounds but spent only 40 to replace jewellery. He held the remains for himself.

Held: Claim was not stale, he was held to be a trustee in claims 2 and 3 only. In claim 1, he was given permission to use money for himself (to buy business equipment) and there was no obligation to give money to his wife. He was not bound to keep this money separate, but was entitled to mix it with his own and deal with it as he pleased. When called upon to hand over an equivalent sum of money he was not a trustee but a mere debtor. (Quoted Channell J in Henry v Hammond)
In claims 2 and 3, she hadn’t authorised him to deal with the property on his account and there was a clear intention that he simply account the money received to his wife. This money was attached to the property so the husband was held to be a trustee regarding claims 2 and 3.
•    Meagher J looked at what kind of rules the statute imposed on agents

Walker v Corboy
Facts: Produce agent, who sells produce on behalf of farmers (principal) goes into receivership. Agent is owed money by purchasers who bought the produce on credit. Can the farmers claim ownership of the debts owed by the purchasers (i.e. did the agents hold those debts on trust)? Or, should the debts be treated as part of the assets of the agent, which would satisfy all the creditors, who held a floating charge over the assets. Farmers claimed the proceeds from the potatoes (debts) belonged to them; hence they claimed that the agents were holding the property on trust for them. I.e. they attempted to jump the queue of creditors.

Held (NSW Ct of Appeal): While a trust may be the normal result in a simple case, there is no universal or inflexible presumption and the task of the court is to determine the intentions of all the parties having regard to all the facts.
Priestley JA: There is not even a prima facie rule in more complex cases. He also rejected the view that one should be disinclined to apply equitable doctrines in a commercial situation.
Clarke JA: Agreed that there is no such principle, but said the court should be cautious in applying equitable doctrines in commercial transactions.
Meagher JA: noted the ‘general reluctance of courts to extend the law of trusts into ordinary commercial transactions.’ Adopted Cohen and said it was a question of intention whether the agent is bound to keep the proceeds separate from his own money.

- Decided on all of the facts that the farmers handed the property to agents and agents were not trustees, they had good title and it was a creditor-debtor relationship between the agent and the farmers.

Debtors:
•    Debtor has a common law obligation to pay the creditor. The debt is a personal obligation and doesn’t attach to property whereas a beneficiary has both a personal and a proprietary right.
•    In cases of insolvency, property held by a bankrupt on trust for another person, is not available to other creditors. Therefore a beneficiary can assert proprietary rights over the trust property, unaffected by creditors’ claims. If there is only a debt, upon bankruptcy an unsecured creditor will receive a rateable distribution out of the bankrupts estate.

Principle
“It is clear that if the terms upon which the person receives the money are that he is bound to keep it separate, either in a bank or elsewhere, and to hand that money so kept as a separate fund to the person entitled to it, then he is the trustee of that money and must hand it over to the person who is his cestui que trust. If on the other hand, he is not bound to keep the money separate, but is entitled to mix it with his own money and deal with it as he please, and when called upon to hand over an equivalent sum of money, then he is not a trustee but a mere debtor ” – Henry v Hammond per Channell J

Continued on page 2

continued
Re Kayford

Facts: A mail order business gets into financial distress, so its accountants set up a separate bank account to hold deposits and payments by its mail order customers, to be drawn only after delivery of goods. The object was to allow the company to fully refund payments to customers should it go into liquidation. The issue was determining who owned the money in this account when the company went bankrupt.

Held: The question is whether in substance a sufficient intention to create a trust has been manifested. The arrangement between the parties involved payment of the money into a separate account, indicating a ‘sufficient intention’ that it would be held on trust for the mail order customers. Also, identify the property is identifiable as personal property and we know to whom the beneficial interest belongs. (Hence the three certainties are satisfied).

Equitable Charge:
“The chargor is under no personal obligation to confer the contemplated benefit on the chargee (person in whose favour the charge is e.g. bank).  If the benefit is not conferred, the chargee may enforce the security by taking proceedings in equity… The chargor is not a fiduciary.”
•    The chargor owns the property legally and beneficially but subject to an equitable charge in favour of the chargee. They are not a trustee and have no fiduciary obligation to the chargee, only a contractual obligation to sell the property.
•    The chargee does not have a personal equitable right in respect of the property (unlike a beneficiary in a trust).
•    The chargee has a proprietary right enforceable by equity against the property i.e. if chargor doesn’t satisfy the security interest, there may be a judicial selling of the property, the proceeds of which will be used to satisfy the charge. The chargee can claim only enough proceeds to satisfy the charge.
•    If it is a trust property, it must be used for the benefit of the beneficiaries perpetually. If it is a charge, the chargor owns the property outright once the charge is paid.

Associated Alloys Pty Ltd v ACN

Facts: Vendor (Alloys) agreed to supply sheet metal to the purchaser subject to retention of title clause in a contract which stated:
“In the event that the [buyer] uses the goods/product in some manufacturing or construction process of its own or some third party, then the [buyer] shall hold such part of the proceeds of such manufacturing or construction as relates to the goods/product in trust for the [seller]. Such part shall be deemed to equal in dollar terms the amount owing by the [buyer] to the [seller] at the time of the receipt of such proceeds.”

The third party (person buying the manufactured goods) had paid some but not the entire purchase price for the products. The buyer went into liquidation.

The flaw in this arrangement is that the raw materials are manufactured into goods by the buyer, along with the labour and costs. Goods go to the buyer, become book debts when buyers purchase on credit and then proceeds get paid. Here the seller retains legal title even thought the property has changed, because the clause gives them a right to the goods and debts etc. Without the clause, legal title is transferred and a bank with a floating charge would get the property if the buyer became insolvent.

Issue: Did this create a charge (which would have to be registered under the Corporations Act to be enforceable against liquidators), or a trust – in which case the seller could claim ownership of the property in the hands of the buyer.

NB: The concept of a floating charge: some assets change or are intangible (e.g. debts customers owe). A floating charge hovers over all the assets you own from time to time and it only crystallises when chargor defaults on a loan or a company goes bust.

Held (Ct of Appeal): This is an equitable charge because there is a mixture of property interests here. The arrangement is defeasible, as it can be undone by payment. This clause was effective however it had to be registered to be enforceable against liquidators.

Held (HCA): overturned the decision and said it created a trust and not an equitable charge.

Majority: This clause was novel. It was held that the word “proceeds” in the clause could be confined to actual monies paid by the third party and not to the book debts. This allowed the equation to operate with certainty. Hence it could be construed as a trust given the parties had manifested appropriate intention to create a trust.
Inclusion of the book debts would be problematic as it would be difficult to determine when the buyer was actually in receipt of the intangible obligation and moreover, it would be difficult to equate a chose in action in dollar terms to the amount owing to the seller at the time of receipt of the proceeds.
It was outside the Corporations law definition of a charge because “proceeds” did not include book debts and if it had, the charge would fail anyway for want of registration.  
Although the clause is effective, the seller could not receive relief for breach of trust.  The seller failed to bring evidence of where the money in the bank was from and if it was actually the proceeds. Need the money trail, have to know what property you are claiming trust over.

Kirby J (dissent): The clause created a charge that was void for registration.

Gift subject to Condition

Re Gardiner

Facts: Gift to son in father’s will – “to Ivor, on condition that he pay Albert 1000 pound within two years”. Ivor and Albert were both executors of the will (there were also 5 other sons). Ivor didn’t fulfil the condition.

Held: The stipulation was a condition, not a trust or a charge or a mere  personal obligation. If condition is not satisfied, gift fails (whole contract fails) and the terms of the will are not followed. Neither son got the property, and the gift passed to the next of kin (the 5 other sons) on an intestacy (so they shared the property equally).

Muschinski v Dodds
Facts: Constructive trust case involving de-facto couple living together. M gives D an interest in property on the condition that their relationship continues. The relationship failed.

Held (Per Dawson and Brennan JJ): if one party gives gift to other (property) on condition that relationship thrives and the relationship subsequently fails, the property goes back to the donor.

“A donee may take the property given either as a trustee or a beneficiary and, if beneficially, he may take it subject to defeasance if the assurance should not be fulfilled or subject to a personal obligation to fulfil the assurance…”  per Brennan J

“Such a condition, whilst not a condition of forfeiture and falling short of creating a trust or a charge, may give rise to a personal equitable obligation analogous to a contractual obligation, enforceable by compensation or, in an appropriate case, by specific performance…”  per Dawson J

Gift Subject to personal obligation

Countess of Bective v FCT
Facts: Trust gave income to Countess so she could pay maintenance etc for a child of the marriage. Is the income hers and therefore taxable or the child’s (via a trust)? Federal Commissioner of Taxation wants to tax this money but Countess claims she has no beneficial interest and it was on trust for a 16 year old who at that time was not entitled to pay tax.

Held (per Dixon J): Four alternative ways to analyse this gift
1.    It could be an absolute gift with merely precatory words of motive, intention, or “hope” as to what to do with the gift. – this bears no legal obligation
2.    Could be a condition  imposing an equitable obligation to perform if the gift is accepted (even if the obligation is more onerous than the gift is worth)
3.    Equitable Charge – Property comes charged. An obligation must be met out of the property, and any left over belongs to the donee (who cannot defeat the charge by rejecting the gift).
4.    Trust  If you read all the words could be interpreted that the recipient acquires no beneficial interest in the fund  this was held here
Countess had to use the whole fund for the benefit of the child and not her own benefit  It was a trust and she didn’t have to pay tax. The child got the benefit of gross amount.

Gill v Gill
•    2nd alternative above
Facts: Father died leaving farm to son with instructions that son should look after unmarried sisters until they were married. He had to allow them a room to sleep, allow them to collect so many eggs and so much milk for their use and some modest income. How should such strange stipulations be given effect (especially when dispute arises 13 years after father’s death)?

Held: Two classes of condition are identified
1.    True conditions which operate merely to divest an estate or to prevent the vesting of an estate  requires certainty so that it is possible at any given moment to say where the property is vested.  
2.    Conditions for the benefit of third parties attached to the possession of property (e.g. property given to beneficiary on condition that he maintain certain persons  creates a quasi-contractual relationship)

What the testator intended depends on the language used to describe the obligation, the nature of the property and the nature of the obligation. The conditions of the present will were not conditions of forfeiture and if they were, the court would treat them as undefined and thus unenforceable. It was an absolute gift and the son was conscience bound.
    There was no intention that the son forfeits the property if the condition was not fulfilled and there was no intention that the sisters retain a beneficial interest which attached to the farm, so there is no trust. Sister is entitled only to income and sustenance, not a share of the farm due to the gift returning to the estate.
    The condition was a personal obligation which could be enforced in equity against the son at the suit of the individual for whom the benefit has been created (sisters). It is the second category condition  damages could only be given for breach of the quasi-contract

Contracts

Differences between trust and contract
•    Trust is equitable; contract is legal
•    Trust does not rely on any consensus from beneficiaries. They need not even know of their entitlements (no “consensus ad idem”)
•    A valid trust is enforceable by beneficiaries, without them giving any consideration
•    A trust can benefit a beneficiary who was not a party to it making, nor even alive at the time of the making of the trust (no privity rule)
•    A trust confers proprietary remedies including a right to trace; contract confers personal remedies (right to damages)

Contracts for benefit of third Parties:

Coulls v Bagot’s Executor and Trustee Co
Facts: Coulls signed an agreement with a company for payment of royalties to himself and his wife, as joint tenants, for 10 years. Question was whether the royalties were effectively assigned to her or if they were payable to the executor of Coulls’ estate. If A contracts with B that, for consideration moving from A, B will provide a benefit to C and B fails to do so. Does B hold A’s promise on trust for C? I.e. since C cannot enforce the contract, can trust be used to overcome the doctrine of privity of contract?

Held (per Windeyer J): C cannot sue B at law as C was not a party to the contract. Discusses conflicting authorities, some of which state that A can enforce the contract on B but will only be entitled to nominal damages because A has not suffered any loss (C has suffered loss). This is contentious and there is no reason why A could not recover substantial damages.
However specific performance was an available remedy because interests in land were involved and damages would be an inappropriate remedy. If A chose this course and obtained judgment against B, A would be enforcing his own right to have the contract performed and not C’s right. The transaction between A and C would be wholly gratuitous but C could not dictate to A what redress to seek.
C cannot seek relief in equity unless A’s right to enforce the contract is held on trust for C. There was no trust here. The contract was only between Mr Coulls and the company so she could not compel proceedings to enforce it, she was not entitled to royalties.

Continued on page 3

continued
Trident General Insurance v McNiece Brothers Pty Ltd

Facts: Contractor took out insurance policy for itself and its sub-contractors. An employee of the sub-contractors was injured, could he enforce the contract agaist the insurance company.

Issue: The problem with the trust solution to the problem of third party benefits

Held: The uncertainty should be resolved by recognising the existence of a trust  where the court can infer or impute intention of both parties from the language employed by the parties, looking at the nature of the transaction and the circumstances (including commercial necessity). If there is intention on the part of the insurer and the assured that these employees are covered, then despite the lack of privity and although consideration has not moved from the third party (employee), the third party can sue on the contract.  Per Mason CJ

“The requisite intention should be inferred if it clearly appears that it was the intention of the promisee that the third party should himself be entitled to insist upon performance and receipt of the benefit and if trust is, in the circumstances the appropriate legal mechanism for giving effect to that intention…Equity’s requirement of an intention to create a trust will be at least prima facie satisfied if the terms of the contract expressly or impliedly manifest that intention as the joint intention of the promisor and promisee”.  per Deane J

(C)    The Three Certainties
The Three Certainties

•    We are concerned here with Express Private Trusts
•    There are three certainties

1.    Intention: there must be an intention to create a trust and not some other kind of relationship or obligation (this is discussed above in (B))
2.    Subject (Property): there can be no trust unless there is separation of legal and equitable title to property. Which property? Unless a court can identify the property impressed by the trust, there can be no trust.
3.    Objects: it must be possible to identify which people (or charitable purposes) are to benefit from the trust – or at least it must be possible to identify sufficiently clear criteria for selecting beneficiaries to a discretionary trust.

Certainty of Intention
•    Before you can have a trust, you need to see there is an intention to create a trust (separation of legal and equitable ownership) not an equitable charge.
•    The person settling the property on trust must have the intention that it be a trust.
•    This will be obvious if a deed of trust is executed, but otherwise have to identify an intention that a trust operates rather than, say, a debt.

Re Williams

Facts: Testator bequeathed residue of his estate to his wife “absolutely, in the fullest confidence”. He gave wife instructions to give proceeds to the daughter. Issue was whether the arrangement between the parties created a trust which the court had jurisdiction to administer or was it merely an exchange of wishes that bounds the wife in honour and conscience only.

Held: Although the court will try to carry out testator’s wishes, there is no presumption in favour of finding a trust. Analysing the language in the will, and nature of property and the transaction etc it was held that there was no intention to create a trust. The word “absolutely” made it an absolute gift and did not allow the daughter a beneficial interest. The husband could no longer provide directions on a gift that is no longer his.
Furthermore, husband used precatory words (words in a will expressing a desire that a thing be done). These words did not create a trust or equitable obligation on the wife. Court will not add words in to create a trust.

•    See earlier Countess of Bective: words used opened up a wider range of alternatives.

Comr Stamp Duties (CSD) v Joliffe (HCA)

Facts: Banking in these days was highly regulated. A banking regulation stated that an individual could only have one savings account in a State bank but may hold more than was if held on trust for others. Regulation also allowed interest to be paid only on a certain amount. To get around this, J opened an account for himself and one on trust for his wife so he wouldn’t suffer the loss of interest having the money in one account.  Wife died and J withdrew the money from the account. CSD charged wife’s estate, including money in that account, with a duty.

Held: J did not intend to create a trust, even though the word ‘trust’ was used. In substance J intended only to procure interest and not to benefit his wife. The account name was a disguise for J’s complete dominion over the money. The court will not impute a trust where none was in fact contemplated. So J could lead the evidence of his intention even though the word trust was used

Dissent (Isaacs J): An open declaration of trust is a declaration of intention that is final and beyond recall.
 
Certainty of Subject
•    Must be able to identify the particular property to be held on trust
•    Identify the extent of the benficiaries’ interest in that property.
•    Requirements are not concrete.

An objective determinant
Re Golay’s Will Trusts

Facts: Testator directed executors to give a proprietary interest in an apartment to a woman named Tossy, who was his associate (concubine), not a family member, before he died. He also left a requirement in the will for “reasonable income” to be paid to Tossy.
Issue: Was the testator’s discretion that they pay a “reasonable income” to Tossy invalid for uncertainty?

Held: “The court is constantly involved in making such objective assessments of what is reasonable and it is not to be deterred form doing so because subjective influences can never be wholly excluded.” This discretion was not uncertain. Court has to exercise some discretion in determining what is reasonable but this doesn’t make it invalid for uncertainty. Court avoids a rigid and arid view of what is “reasonable”.

What if property is part of a larger pool of assets?

Hunter v Moss
Facts: Defendant declared themselves trustee over 50 of his 950 shares. Plaintiff argued 50 unidentified and similar shares out of 950 didn’t sufficiently identify specific property to be held on trust and should thus fail for uncertainty of subject.

Issue: Was trust invalid because each share has its own identification number and he didn’t specify which particular subset of the 950 shares he was declaring trust over.

Held: The subject matter was sufficiently certain and segregating the property was not necessary. They could identify that the shares existed and that the settlor owned the shares at the time. Hence the beneficial interest could be identified (could identify shares through the tracing rules). It did not matter which 50/950 shares he declared trust over.

Certainty of Objects

•    Not a problem if all the beneficiaries are named, but often the trusts are not fixed trusts
•    Discretionary trusts  settlor doesn’t want to be legal owner of property anymore for tax purposes etc. They also don’t know who beneficiaries are and don’t want anyone to know who the beneficiaries are straight away. Don’t want Saunders v Gautier scenario, they want to be able to make flexible decisions and hold power to confer benefit.
•    Trust is still valid but doesn’t confer any immediate beneficial interest.
•    How is such a case sufficiently certain of objects?

Where a trustee is given a special power to select beneficiaries from among a class, the class must be sufficiently certain to enable the trustee to make the selection. Must the trustee be able to make a complete list of beneficiaries (“list certainty”)? Or is it sufficient that the trust can tell, of any given candidate, that he or she is “in” or “out” (“criterion certainty”)?

•    Consider Re Gulbenkian and Re Badens

Continued on page 4

Continued
The Beneficiary Principle

Morice v Bishop of Durham

Facts: Testatrix left the residue of her estate on trust “to such objects of benevolence and liberality as the Bishop of Durham in his own discretion shall most approve of”.

Held: “There can be no trust, over which this court will not assume control; for an uncontrollable power of disposition would be ownership and not a trust. If there be a clear trust, but for uncertain objects, the property, that is, the subject of the trust, is indisposed of, and the benefit of such trust must result to those whom the law gives ownership in default of disposition by the former owner. But this doctrine does not hold with regard to trusts for charity. Every other trust must have a definite object. There must be somebody in whose favour the court can decree performance”

The bequest was void for uncertainty. Neither ‘benevolence’ nor ‘liberality’ denoted a charitable purpose, hence the certainty of objects rule had to be applied.
If the Bishop has absolute power, then he has the power to deal with the bequest as he pleases. But if there is a trust, then unless the testatrix identifies a definite object (beneficiaries), the property returns to her estate and subsequently to her next of kin on an intestacy.

•    Perpetuity  Common law abhorred the idea that this creation of equity had potential to tie up income-producing property and sterilise it indefinitely.
•    Statute of Mortmain  clutches of the dead can’t determine what happens to property.
•    There is a rule against perpetuation of a trust when no one would be a beneficiary. Beneficial interests had to be created within 21 yrs of death of settlor.
•    A charitable trust is not subject to the rule against perpetuities
•    Can’t have a valid private trust that seems to go on for ever, it is subject to rule against perpetuities (80 yrs under statute)
Discretionary Trusts

“A trust is not uncertain merely because the actual persons entitled to the trust property cannot be known in advance of the date of distribution (provided no perpetuity is involved); it is sufficient if the provisions of the trust ensure that upon that date the beneficiaries can be ascertained with certainty” – Jacobs

•    Discretionary trusts involve gifts to classes of objects. The trustee, or a person appointed under the trust, exercises a power of selecting beneficiaries from among that class.

Distinguish between a Trust Power and a Mere Power
•    A trust is imperative
•    A power is permissive
•    We ask question if appointer is a fiduciary or not?

General Power: If someone given property and told they can give it to anyone they want, it is not a trust, although it confers a general power on the donee to dispose of it as they wish, it is an absolute gift.

Special Power: donee is to appoint from among a defined class of objects

Hybrid Power: Person given the property can appoint anybody except certain persons in a defined class. Usually can’t give it to themselves or back to the settlor (so there is no issue of not having alienated the property from themselves)

•    We focus on special powers
•    Special powers can be a “mere” (or “bare”) power or a trust power (that must be exercised according to the terms of the trust)

Bare Powers:
A trustee who is the donee of a bare power must:
•    Consider periodically whether or not to exercise it
•    Consider the range of possible appointments
•    Consider the appropriateness of individual appointments

A non-fiduciary donee of a bare power may refuse to exercise the power. In that case, the property goes to those entitled in default of exercise of that power.

Even a non-fiduciary donee of the power may not commit a “fraud on a power” i.e. an exercise of the power dishonestly, capriciously or for an improper purpose. Person claiming improper purpose (i.e. person identified by the settlor) would get the gift over in default.

A gift over in default is evidence of a bare power (because it demonstrates that the donor contemplated the possibility that the donee would not exercise the power).  

Trust Power    

Donor intends that the donee is obliged to exercise the power. If there is no gift over in default, how do we decide if it is a mere power or a trust power?

Re Leek Dec’d
•    Buckley J’s five categories
(i)    Language clearly imposes a duty to select = trust power
(ii)    Property given on trust for such members of a class as donee shall select (i.e. power of exclusion), there is no gift over in default = trust power
(iii)    Property given on trust for such members of a class as donee may select, it is a gift over in default = mere power. (Word may is permissive)
(iv)    No gift in default, but terms clearly indicate selection is at the absolute discretion of the donee = mere power
(v)    Terms are neither manifestly permissive nor mandatory, no gift in default = doubtful

What is the test for certainty of objects?
•    This issue never been brought before Ct in Australia. Issue could be resolved differently in Australia from the way it has been in HOL (exam Q)

Re Gestetner
Harman J: the test of certainty for a trust power requires that the trustees must be able to compile a list of all members of the class: “list certainty”. This is a more rigorous test because specific individual must be named.
    For bare powers, the class must be defined so that the trustees can tell of any given individual whether that person is “in or out” of the class. I.e. there must be some criteria that can be applied to determine if a candidate is in or out of the class.

Re Gulbelkian’s Settlements (HOL decision therefore has more weight)

Facts: Calouste Gulbenkian had a son, Nubar, who was desolate: he spent money and couldn’t be trusted. He wanted to ensure that the estate could not be dissipated by the son absolutely.

Issue: Was a valid trust created by settlements made by Calouste Gulbenkian on the following terms: The trustees “shall”…at their absolute discretion pay all or any part of the income of the property …for the maintenance and personal support or benefit of all or any one or more to the exclusion of the other or others of the following persons…[including] any person or persons in whose house or apartments or in whose company or under whose care or control or by or with whom the said Nubar Gulbenkian may from time to time be employed or residing…”

There being a gift over in default, it was agreed by the parties that this gave the trustees a bare power.

Held (per Upjohn LJ): Affirms the distinction drawn by Harman J in Re Gestetner

Regarding trust powers: “The trustees have a duty to select the donees of the donor’s bounty from among the class designated by the donor; he has not entrusted them with any power to select the donees merely from among known claimants who are within the class, for that is constituting a narrower class and the donor has given them no power to do this…”

Regarding mere powers: “…with respect to mere powers, while the court cannot compel the trustees to exercise their powers, yet those entitled to the fund in default must clearly be entitled to restrain the trustees from exercising it save among those within the power. So the trustees or the court must be able to say with certainty who is within and who is without the power.”

The clause had a clear general object even though it contained poor grammar and ran too many situations together. It should be read in light of its general intention and construed with the object of giving effect to it if possible. Here the clause was not void for uncertainty.

What about pension funds and other trusts where the class of beneficiaries is huge? Does the requirement of list certainty for trust powers hinder the use of trusts in such cases?

Continued on page 5

continued
Re Baden’s Deed Trusts, McPhail v Doulton (1971) AC 424 (HOL)

Facts: “Clause 9(a): The trustees shall apply the net income of the fund in making at their absolute discretion grants to or for the benefit of any of the officers and employees or ex-officers or ex-employees of the company or to any relatives or dependants of any such persons in such amounts at such times and on such conditions (if any) as they think fit and any such grant may at their discretion be made by payment to the beneficiary or to any institution or person to be applied for his or her benefit…
Clause 10: all benefits being at the absolute discretion of the trustees, no persons shall have any right title or interest in the fund otherwise than pursuant to the exercise of such discretion…”

Court of Appeal: Held to be a mere power, and valid

On appeal, House of Lords (majority not including Upjohn LJ):
It was a trust power: the class of beneficiaries was huge, there was no gift over in default. “Absolute discretion” was regarding who to select and not whether a selection was made, so it was in fact a trust power. But the test of certainty for a trust power was same as for a bare power. So the question of validity was later remitted to Chancery.

Wilberforce LJ (HOL decision):
•    The distinction between a trust power and a mere power is often “artificial”.
•    Validity therefore ought not to depend on “such delicate shading”
•    The Broadway Cottages test of “list certainty” should be discarded
•    “The test for validity of trust powers ought to be similar to that accepted…in Re Gulbenkian’s Settlements for powers, namely that the trust is valid if it can be said with certainty that any given individual is or is not a member of the class”
•    This does not mean there is a complete assimilation of trust powers with mere powers
•    In the case of mere powers, a court will not compel exercise but will intervene to prevent capricious exercise.
•    In the case of trust powers, if a trustee fails to exercise the power, the court will exercise it.
•    “Loose class” requirement: even where the words used are clear (i.e. there is semantic certainty), a gift may fail if the definition of beneficiaries is so hopelessly wide as not to form anything like a class so that the trust is administratively unworkable. (example: “all the residents of Greater London”)

Re Badens Deed Trusts (No. 2) (1973)

Facts: Case remitted to the Chancery Division to determine whether the trust was sufficiently certain under the criterion certainty test. Brightman J held the power was valid. There was an appeal to the Court of Appeal.

Issue: whether the words “dependants” and “relatives” were sufficiently criterion certain.

Held: Appeal dismissed
•    “Dependants” has been judicially defined, so it does not infringe the criterion certainty rule.
•    “Relatives”  3 different approaches

Sachs LJ: held that it was not necessary to be able to state with certainty that a certain claimant was not within the class. So long as the class is conceptually certain, it becomes “a question of fact to be determined on evidence whether any postulant has on inquiry been proved to be within it: if he is not so proved then he is not in it”. He held that even the widest meaning of the word “relative” did not produce uncertainty.
Note: There only needs to be semantic certainty that even one person falls into the class. (Least rigid approach)

Megaw LJ: held that “the test is satisfied if, as regards at least a substantial number of objects, it can be said with certainty that they fall within the trust”, even if it cannot be provided that others are in or out. So “relatives” is sufficiently certain.

Stamp LJ: considered that the court needed to be able to say of any given individual that he or she is, or is not a member of the class in order to satisfy the test. It is not enough that there is one person, or a group of people, whose membership of the class is clear if about others there is significant uncertainty. He notes that the view of the Court of Appeal (in McPhail v Doulton) was rejected by the House of Lords, and yet the criterion certainty test as interpreted by Sachs LJ might be satisfied by just one claimant. Stamp LJ said the court ought to construe “relations” to mean “next of kin”, or in the case of a living person “nearest blood relations”. On this construction he held the power was valid. (Toughest test)

Note Jacobs: Re Badens has generally been followed at lower levels in Australia, i.e. there may be a subtly different approach to what they call the same criterion certainty test. However the test for determining certainty of trust has not been decided in the High Court yet.

Hybrid Power

Re Manisty’s Settlement
Facts: Concerned a “hybrid power” or “intermediate power” rather than a special power. Trustee had a list and a power to add other persons to list at any stage. Appointer wanted to add widow of the settlor to the list.

Issue: Can the settlor validly grant power on trustees to
1.    select beneficiaries from list A, and
2.    add any person to that list except persons in list B?

Held: Hybrid power was valid.
Templeman J: “If a person within the ambit of the power is aware of its existence he can require the trustees to consider exercising the power and in particular to consider a request on his part for the power to be exercised in his favour. The trustees must consider this request, and if they decline to do so or can be proved to have omitted to do so, then the aggrieved person may apply to the court which may remove the trustee and appoint others in their place…[the trustees] are bound…to consider at all times during which the trust is to continue whether or not they are to distribute any and if so what part of the fund and, if so, to whom they should distribute it…”

Templeman J disagrees that this confers too much power on trustees and other appointers citing with approval Harman J from Re Gestetner: “The settlor had good reason, I have no doubt, to trust the persons whom he appointed trustees; but I cannot see here that there is such a duty as makes it essential for these trustees, before parting with any income or capital, to survey the whole field and to consider whether A is more deserving of bounty than B.”

When does it really matter whether a power is a trust or a bare power?

What happens to the trust property if the donee of the power fails to exercise the power?
•    In the case of a mere power, it goes to those entitled to the gift over in default
•    In the case of a trust power, a court of equity can appoint a new trustee or decide itself.

If there is an improper exercise of power who has standing to complain?
•    In the case of a mere power, those entitled to the gift over in default have standing to complain of fraud on a power
•    In the case of a trust power, beneficiaries (potential beneficiaries) have standing to complain of a breach of trust.